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709 
Note 
 
Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of 
Law and Internet Legal Resources 
Mathew Rotenberg∗
In July 2004, Ernest Chavis drafted a will at the request of 
his 91-year-old former neighbor, Annie Belle Weiss.
 
1 Chavis 
used a “Quicken lawyer disk” to generate the document on his 
computer, filled in the blanks, and brought the will to Ms. 
Weiss to sign.2 After Ms. Weiss’s death, Chavis was sued by Ms. 
Weiss’s family members who alleged Chavis had “engaged in 
the unauthorized practice of law” in violation of a South Caro-
lina statute.3 In January 2007, the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina agreed with Ms. Weiss’s family, and found that 
Chavis had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.4
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throughout the process of writing this Note, as he has for the past 25 years of 
my life. Thanks to Professors Richard Painter and Robert Stein for their valu-
able advice and guidance. Thanks to Matthew Lippert, the staff, and editors of 
Minnesota Law Review for their many contributions to this Note. A special 
thanks to Chris Schmitter, Brian Burke, and Michael Benchimol for their loy-
alty and friendship and who encouraged me to write this Note with Gangnam 
style. Finally, this Note could never have been written without the loyalty and 
support of my mother Beth Pearlman, my strongest advocate and executive 
producer of my life. Copyright © 2012 by Mathew Rotenberg.  
 Inter-
estingly, the court raised no objections to the document itself, 
nor did the court deny that the document likely effectuated Ms. 
 1. Franklin v. Chavis, 640 S.E.2d 873, 875 (S.C. 2007).  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id; see id. at 876 (explaining that under South Carolina law, “even the 
preparation of standard forms that require no creative drafting may constitute 
the practice of law” and “the purpose of prohibiting the unauthorized practice 
of law is to protect the public”); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (b)(2) 
(2012) (“A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not: 
hold out to the public . . . that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this 
jurisdiction.”); ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (b)(2) (2012) 
(same). 
 4. Chavis, 640 S.E.2d at 876.  
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Weiss’s intent.5
The formalistic application of unauthorized practice rules 
is not limited to the state of South Carolina. Case law from 
many jurisdictions holds that the generation of legal documents 
by lay people—whether over the Internet or in person—
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.
 Though Chavis used the Internet to create in-
expensive and accurate documents that memorialized the will 
of his elderly neighbor, the court formalistically applied the un-
authorized practice of law rules of South Carolina and found 
Chavis in violation of state law. 
6 This strict appli-
cation of unauthorized practice statutes is also not isolated to 
individuals; Internet legal providers (ILPs) have recently en-
countered other direct legal assaults. On August 22, 2011, 
around 15,000 litigants settled a class action suit against In-
ternet legal forms provider LegalZoom.com, Inc.7 The suit, 
which alleged violations of the Missouri unauthorized practice 
of law statute,8 is only one example of recent legal action 
against ILPs.9
The emergence of ILPs, and litigation involving them, ex-
poses a largely unsettled legal terrain.
  
10
 
 5. See id. at 877. The South Carolina Supreme Court did not nullify the 
will, stating “it should not be invalidated simply because it was drafted by a 
nonlawyer.” Id. (citing Peterson v. Howland (In re Peterson’s Estate), 42 
N.W.2d 59, 66 (Minn. 1950)).  
 State legislatures 
drafted most unauthorized practice statutes prior to the emer-
 6. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document 
Preparation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 
836–49 (2002) (discussing a Texas court decision to enjoin the sale of a CD-
ROM that provided advice on how to fill out legal forms, and a series of federal 
bankruptcy court decisions to enjoin lay people from advising debtors through 
the preparation of legal forms).  
 7. Nathan Koppel, Seller of Online Legal Forms Settles Unauthorized 
Practice of Law Suit, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Aug. 23, 2011, 11:47 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/23/seller-of-online-legal-forms-settles 
-unauthorized-practiced-of-law-suit/. 
 8. Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 508 (W.D. Mo. 2010).  
 9. See, e.g., Frankfort Digital Servs. v. Kistler (In re Reynoso), 477 F.3d 
1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the website, owned by a non-lawyer, 
that “offer[ed] legal advice and projected an aura of expertise concerning 
bankruptcy petitions,” constituted unauthorized practice of law); Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 
1999) (vacating an order to enjoin a company from selling legal software be-
cause the Texas Legislature had enacted a statute specifying that the sale of 
computer software did not constitute the practice of law).  
 10. See Melissa Blades & Sarah Vermylen, Virtual Ethics for a New Age: 
The Internet and the Ethical Lawyer, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 637, 651 (2004) 
(stating that case law on the topic of ILPs is “sparse”).  
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gence of the Internet or without any focus on recent advance-
ments in computer research capabilities.11 For that reason, the-
se statutes lack clarity and their application to ILPs is outdated 
and forced. In addition, ILPs inherently exist in a multi-
jurisdictional setting, the Internet, which is unlike the tradi-
tional localized legal practices these statutes anticipated. There 
are potentially fifty different legal structures which govern 
ILPs,12
Advances in computer technology are effectively commodi-
tizing the law and revolutionizing the ways in which individu-
als seek and receive legal services.
 creating myriad and inconsistent regulation of Internet 
legal space.  
13 ILPs present tremendous 
potential for increased access to legal services.14 Efficient and 
low-cost legal information is vital to an increasing number of 
unrepresented litigants15 and to combat the shrinking amounts 
of legal aid available to them.16 Technology has the potential to 
benefit a court system significantly burdened by unprepared 
and uninformed litigants.17
 
 11. See generally Steve French, When Public Policies Collide . . . Legal 
“Self-Help” Software and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 27 RUTGERS COM-
PUTER & TECH. L.J. 93, 95–101, 120 (2001) (providing a thorough discussion of 
the historical development of state specific practice of law definitions, and not-
ing “that existing definitions and analytical approaches to the unauthorized 
practice of law simply fail in the computer age”). For further discussion on the 
development of the unauthorized practice of law rules in the context of self-
help, see Julee C. Fischer, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Pro-
tection or Protection of the Legal Cartel?, 34 IND. L. REV. 121, 123–48 (2000).  
 Seen in this light, the vague and 
 12. Compare, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(c) (West 2005) (“[T]he 
‘practice of law’ does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution, 
display, or sale, including publication, distribution, display, or sale by means 
of an Internet web site, of . . . computer software, or similar products . . . .”), 
with Kistler, 477 F.3d at 1126 (finding that the practice of law does include 
operating a website that offers automated counsel in bankruptcy matters).  
 13. See Chris Johnson, Leveraging Technology to Deliver Legal Services, 
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 259, 262–66 (2009) (discussing the business models of 
three online legal service providers). 
 14. See id. at 279–81 (arguing that consumers stand to benefit from the 
availability of affordable legal services).  
 15. See generally Richard W. Painter, Symposium on Ethical Issues and 
Trends in Family Law: Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A 
Legal Crisis and its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45 (2011) (arguing that affordable 
legal services are especially important in times of financial hardship in light of 
research characterizing the poor quality of pro se litigation).  
 16. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 13, at 280–81 (citing the revenue from 
interest on lawyers’ trust accounts as an important and declining source of le-
gal aid funds).  
 17. See Painter, supra note 15, at 45 (“[L]itigants are generally doing a 
poor job of representing themselves and are burdening the courts.” (citing ABA 
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outmoded language of the unauthorized practice statutes, and 
their uneven application, is a more serious problem than ever 
before. It decreases confidence in the legal system, and pre-
vents millions of potential users who stand to benefit signifi-
cantly from the growth of ILPs. 
This Note offers solutions to anachronistic and inconsistent 
unauthorized practice of law statutes as they relate to non-
attorney ILPs, while also recognizing that some regulation of 
ILPs is needed. Part I of this Note examines the development of 
the unauthorized practice statutes, the emergence of ILPs, and 
their conflicting interests. Part II argues that unauthorized 
practice statutes stifle the potential benefits of access to ILPs, 
and that the potential benefit of increased access to ILPs out-
weighs the historic rationale behind strict unauthorized prac-
tice statutes. Part III advocates for the implementation of a 
two-part solution: (1) states should adopt a new ABA Model 
Rule that relaxes regulation of personalized and advanced fea-
tures of ILPs, and (2) ILPs should be required to comply with 
reasonable state disclosure and accreditation requirements. 
Implementing this solution will remove the stifling barriers to 
valuable legal technology, and in turn, dramatically increase 
access to quality legal services.  
I.  SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: A BRIEF HISTORY 
OF NON-ATTORNEY INTERNET LEGAL RESOURCES AND 
THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW   
Information technology is advancing faster than the slow-
to-adapt, precedent-based U.S. legal system can regulate it.18 
This trend is especially pronounced in the case of the Internet, 
which rapidly revolutionized the mechanisms and substance of 
communication, and permeates into nearly “every facet of socie-
ty.”19
 
COAL. FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE IMPACT OF 
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS (2010))). 
 The history of regulating the practice of law, and the more 
recent emergence of ILPs, illustrates two phenomena on a colli-
sion course; the outcome of which will determine how, and ul-
timately which, individuals receive legal services.  
 18. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 123 (“The explosion of information tech-
nology is growing faster than it can be regulated. Technology has outpaced the 
states' capacity to develop rules for providing legal services electronically.”).  
 19. See Shari Claire Lewis & Dylan Braverman, The Internet “Big Bang” 
Unauthorized Practice of Law in the Cyber Age, FOR THE DEF., Oct. 2007, 26, 
26. 
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A. WHAT IS THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW?  
Under principles of federalism, defining and regulating the 
practice of law is traditionally a function of individual states.20 
Rules governing the unauthorized practice of law restrict the 
conduct of both lawyers and non-lawyers, while state legisla-
tures and state courts promulgate those rules.21
1. The Development of Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Structures  
  
Prior to the twentieth century, a non-lawyer violated the 
unauthorized practice of law rules only by representing another 
individual in court.22 State administration was straightforward 
because those who appeared before the court were easily identi-
fiable.23 With the creation of bar associations in the early twen-
tieth century, sophisticated regulations for the practice of law 
began and many bar associations adopted objectives “to condi-
tion bar membership upon various educational requirements.”24 
The New York County Lawyers Association appointed the first 
committee on unauthorized practice of law in 1914 in response 
to a growing business industry and its overlapping legal work.25
Until the 1930s, state bar associations focused primarily on 
“nonlawyer appearances in court” and largely ignored the sig-
nificant public danger that broader unauthorized practice of 
law creates.
 
26
 
 20. See French, supra note 
 “In the wake of the Depression,” however, nu-
merous states’ bar associations formed unauthorized practice 
11, at 95; Christina L. Underwood, Balancing 
Consumer Interests in a Digital Age: A New Approach to Regulating the Unau-
thorized Practice of Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 437, 439 (2004).  
 21. La Tanya James & Siyeon Lee, Adapting the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Provisions to Modern Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1137 
(2001) (“Rules governing the unauthorized practice of law are usually state-
specific legislative or court measures. Rules that prohibit the unauthorized 
practice of law restrict the conduct of both lawyers and non-lawyers.”).  
 22. Susan D. Hoppock, Enforcing Unauthorized Practice of Law Prohibi-
tions: The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and its Impact on Effective 
Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 721 (2007).  
 23. Id.  
 24. See ABA COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN 
LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS 16 (Aug. 1995), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/clientpro/Non_Lawyer_Activity 
.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 25. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitu-
tional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (1981). 
 26. See id.  
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committees and many states “enacted or broadened unauthor-
ized practice statutes.”27 The American Bar Association (ABA) 
created its committee on unauthorized practice in 1930, and by 
1938, over 400 unauthorized practice committees were estab-
lished.28 In the latter half of the twentieth century, unauthor-
ized practice rules became more uniform as state courts imple-
mented versions of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules), promulgated by the ABA.29
Today, a majority of states empower committees to investi-
gate and enforce unauthorized practice of law violations.
 
30 In 
many jurisdictions, the state supreme court creates and super-
vises these committees.31 In other jurisdictions, local bar asso-
ciations create unauthorized practice committees, though they 
are still subject to state supreme court oversight.32
2. The Purpose of Prohibiting the Unauthorized Practice of 
Law  
 
The primary rationale offered for unauthorized practice of 
law regulation is to protect the public from the consequences of 
ineffectual legal services.33
 
 27. See id. at 8–9.  
 According to the ABA Model Rules, 
 28. Id. at 8; see also French, supra note 11, at 97–98. 
 29. See Charles W. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate 
Out-of-State Lawyers, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015, 1046 n.136 (2002). 
 30. See French, supra note 11, at 98.  
 31. E.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:22-1 (West 2012) (“The Supreme Court shall ap-
point a committee on the unauthorized practice of law consisting of 21 attor-
neys of this State and four lay members.”); see French, supra note 11, at 98.  
 32. See French, supra note 11, at 98; e.g., RULES REGULATING THE 
FLORIDA BAR: CH. 10. RULES GOVERNING THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECU-
TION OF THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW, RULE 10-1.1 (July 1, 2012),  
available at http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/0/ 6141E3A803F2F 
87C85256B29004BEB60/$FILE/RRTFB%20CHAPTER%2010.pdf?OpenElement 
(“The Florida Bar, as an official arm of the court, is charged with the duty of 
considering, investigating, and seeking the prohibition of matters pertaining 
to the unlicensed practice of law and the prosecution of alleged offenders.”).  
 33. See James I. Averitt, Legal Ethics and the Internet: Defining a Law-
yer ’s Professional Responsibility in a New Frontier, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 171, 
173 (2004–2005) (quoting TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 5.5 cmt. 1 (Vernon 2005)) (“Comment 1 to Rule 5.05 of the Texas Discipli-
nary Rules of Professional Conduct describes the rationale for prohibiting non-
lawyers from practicing law: ‘Courts generally have prohibited the unauthor-
ized practice of law . . . to protect . . . the public . . . from the mistakes of the 
untrained . . . .’”); French, supra note 11, at 96 (“The principal justification of-
fered for unauthorized practice of law prohibitions is ‘to protect the public 
from the consequences of inexpert legal services.’” (quoting MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT Ann. R. 5.5 cmt. (1996))).  
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“[l]imiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects 
the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified 
persons.”34 This assumed justification has gone largely unchal-
lenged for over one hundred years.35
Asserting public welfare as justification, attorneys, bar as-
sociations, and unauthorized practice committees have high-
lighted alleged problems arising from non-lawyers practicing 
law. Untrained individuals can seriously harm a client with 
advice on multifaceted legal issues without understanding the 
complexities involved.
  
36 Inaccurate advice can prejudice a cli-
ent’s case or lead to further expenses and litigation.37 Clients 
may also have false expectations as to the scope and expertise 
of the non-lawyer, as consumers are likely to expect legal ser-
vice providers to have legal training.38 Additionally, and per-
haps most relevant to Internet practice, clients of non-lawyers 
practicing law waive the protections provided by state rules 
governing confidentiality,39 conflicts of interest,40 and attorney-
client privileges.41
Finally, the legal profession is a very big business.
  
42 Unau-
thorized practice statutes unquestionably shield the profession 
from most external competition.43
 
 34. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 1 (1995). 
 While the economic motiva-
tions of the bar are beyond the scope of this Note, it is clear 
from empirical study that public policy concerns were not the 
 35. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 139.  
 36. See Underwood supra note 20, at 440.  
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2002) (requir-
ing lawyers to take “reasonable precautions to prevent . . . information from 
coming into the hands of unintended recipients”).  
 40. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2002) (stating that 
conflict of interest is created when lawyers represent clients with directly ad-
verse interests).  
 41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 
(2000) (affirming that “[p]rivileged persons . . . are the client[,] . . . the client’s 
lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between them, and 
agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representation”). For a discussion of the 
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law, see generally id. § 4.  
 42. See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Dis-
carding Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the 
Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1232 (1995) (proposing a new paradigm, “the 
practice of law is a business,” to explain the state of legal professionalism).  
 43. See RICHARD L. ABEL, Ch. 5 Restrictive Practices: Controlling Produc-
tion by Producers, in AMERICAN LAWYERS 112, 112–26 (1991). 
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only driving forces behind the expansion and strengthening of 
unauthorized practice of law statutes.44
3. Methods of Enforcement  
  
Each state’s highest court has the inherent power to regu-
late the practice of law within the state.45 This authority is typ-
ically delegated to state bar associations or unauthorized prac-
tice committees, who act as the primary interpretive, 
investigative, and enforcement mechanisms in most jurisdic-
tions.46 In some jurisdictions, multiple authorities enforce un-
authorized practice rules, including state attorneys general, 
private individuals, state bar committees, supreme court com-
mittees, and local county attorneys.47 States have implemented 
a variety of sanctions and strategies to enforce unauthorized 
practice regulations. The most common include civil injunc-
tions,48 restitution,49 disbarment,50
 
 44. See generally Rhode, supra note 
 suspension, criminal and 
25, at 3–42 (discussing the historical 
development of unauthorized practice of law rules and conducting an empiri-
cal analysis of contemporary unauthorized practice of law enforcement activi-
ty). 
 45. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, Regulation of Lawyers and the Legal Pro-
fession: Inherent Powers of Courts to Regulate Lawyers, in MODERN LEGAL 
ETHICS 22–24 (West 1986) (explaining that courts have chosen to regulate the 
legal profession on a theory of inherent power, and through the “negative in-
herent powers doctrine [most courts] assert[] that only the courts, and not the 
legislative or executive branches of government, may regulate the practice of 
law”).  
 46. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T ANN. CODE §§ 81.101-04 (West 2005) (defining 
the “practice of law,” establishing that the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Committee (UPLC) is comprised of “nine persons appointed by the supreme 
court,” consisting of at least three lay citizens, and that the UPLC is responsi-
ble for enforcing Texas' unauthorized practice of law statute); see also supra 
Part I.A.1.  
 47. See ABA Standing Comm. on Client Prot., ABA Ctr. for Prof’l Respon-
sibility, 2004 Survey of Unlicensed Practice of Law Committees (Dec. 2004), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/2004INTRO.DOC (comparing 
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law in thirty-six U.S. states).  
 48. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. R. § 16-22-208(b) (LexisNexis 1999); Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law Comm. of the Supreme Court of Colo. v. Prog, 761 P.2d 
1111, 1116 (Colo. 1988); Bray v. Brooks, 41 S.W.3d 7, 14–15 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 49. See, e.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C., v. Super. Ct., 
949 P.2d 1, 13 (Cal. 1998); State v. Hillbrant, No. A05-820, 2006 WL 2052872, 
at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 2006).  
 50. See, e.g., In re Szuba, 896 So.2d 976, 982 (La. 2005) (suspending an 
attorney for 1 year); In re Caver, 841 So.2d 770, 772 (La. 2003) (disbarring at-
torney). Note, however, that such a sanction may do little to dissuade a non-
lawyer not admitted to the bar in the first place.  
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civil contempt,51 sanctions in the current legal proceedings,52 
private cause of action,53 and criminal prosecutions.54
4. Defining the Practice of Law  
 Although 
a number of remedies are available, states vary dramatically in 
method and vigor of unauthorized practice enforcement  
Despite the extensive history of unauthorized practice 
committees and their enforcement mechanisms, the unauthor-
ized practice of law lacks a precise definition, and is ambiguous 
as to whom it applies.55 As a result, it is difficult for courts and 
legislatures to determine what activity by non-lawyers consti-
tutes the unauthorized practice of law.56 Yet there is cross-
jurisdictional agreement that legal practice extends beyond 
representation in court,57 and can include giving legal advice, 
holding oneself out as an attorney, and preparing legal docu-
ments.58
 
 51. See, e.g., In re Banks, 805 A.2d 990, 998–1003 (D.C. 2002).  
 Some states also include preparation of pleadings and 
 52. See, e.g., Grenga v. Bank One, N.A., No. 04 MA 94, 2005 WL 2065117, 
at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26 2005) (unpublished).  
 53. See, e.g., Fogarty v. Parker, 961 So.2d 784, 790–91 (Ala. 2006) (recog-
nizing a private cause of action for unauthorized practice of law in Alabama); 
Touchy v. Houston Legal Found., 432 S.W.2d 690, 694 (Tex. 1968) (“Recogniz-
ing the right of private attorneys to institute an action . . . to enjoin the unau-
thorized practice of law . . . which is demeaning the legal profession and harm-
ful to the plaintiffs.”).  
 54. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-7 (LexisNexis 2012) (“Any person, firm or 
corporation who is not a regularly licensed attorney who does an act defined in 
this article to be an act of practicing law is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-43-2-1 (LexisNexis 2012) (providing that a person who 
engages in the authorized practice of law “[c]ommits a Class B misdemeanor”); 
see also Hoppock, supra note 22, at 730 n.85 (“As of 2004, twenty-five jurisdic-
tions reported to impose criminal fines. Of those, twenty-two imposed prison 
sentences.” (citations omitted)).  
 55. See Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay 
Conveyancers—Empirical Evidence Says “Cease Fire!”, 31 CONN. L. REV. 423, 
450 (1999) (“The unauthorized practice of law is not precisely defined.”).  
 56. See Underwood, supra note 20, at 444.  
 57. E.g., Ostrovsky v. Monroe (In re Ellingson), 230 B.R. 427, 434 (Bankr. 
D. Mo. 1999) (“Montana follows the majority view that preparation or filling in 
of blanks on preprinted forms constitutes the practice of law.”).  
 58. See Erika C. Birg, Lawyers on the Road: The Unauthorized Practice of 
Law and the 2004 Presidential Election, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 305, 309–15 
(2005) (comparing Alabama’s narrow definition of “practicing law” to the 
broader definitions of the ABA and other states such as Georgia, where “giving 
legal advice” constitutes the practice of law); Blades & Vermylen, supra note 
10, at 638 (“Generally, the practice of law includes rending legal advice, prep-
aration of legal documents, and holding oneself out as engaged in the prepara-
tion of legal instruments.” (footnote omitted)).  
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provision of any service that necessitates the use of legal skill 
or knowledge to constitute the practice of law.59 Relevant to In-
ternet legal services, a majority of jurisdictions require “some 
type of personalized contact between the attorney and client,” 
to constitute the practice of law,60 while a minority of jurisdic-
tions uphold broader restrictions that do not require personal-
ized contact.61
Nonetheless, significant confusion persists because indi-
vidual states define the practice of law differently. State defini-
tions themselves are also “consistently vague,”
  
62 and as the Su-
preme Court of Arizona has proclaimed, “[i]n the light of the 
historical development of the lawyer’s functions, it is impossible 
to lay down an exhaustive definition . . . .”63 The ABA Model 
Rules, which many states have adopted,64 also fail to provide a 
clear definition of the practice of law. In September of 2002, in 
response to wide-ranging critiques, the ABA attempted to draft 
a clearer model definition.65 Instead of revising the language, 
the ABA concluded that a model definition was not feasible, 
and issued a general report recommending that all states adopt 
individualized definitions.66 Most states, however, have refused 
to change the vague and broad language of the ABA Model 
Rules.67
Justice Potter Stewart’s threshold test, “I know it when I 
see it,” famously used to characterize pornography, seems all 
too appropriate to describe modern regulation of the practice of 
law.
  
68
 
 59. See, e.g., Blades & Vermylen, supra note 
 As ILP technology advances, vague and inconsistent un-
authorized practice statutes cloud the legality of important ILP 
10, at 638 (citing Joel Mi-
chael Schwarz, Practicing Law over the Internet: Sometimes Practice Doesn’t 
Make Perfect, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 657, 660 (2001)). 
 60. Id. at 651.  
 61. Id.  
 62. See Lewis & Braverman, supra note 19, at 27.  
 63. State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 8–9 
(Ariz. 1961).  
 64. See Wolfram, supra note 29, at 1046 n.136 (“It took more than ABA 
action . . . to make the lawyer codes . . . regulatory. That was accomplished in 
the great majority of states by persuading the state’s highest court . . . to 
adopt a version of the ABA model lawyer code as local law.”).  
 65. See Underwood, supra note 20, at 449.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Wolfram, supra note 29, at 1046.  
 68. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring).  
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services, and may significantly affect its potential for wide-
spread public use. 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF INTERNET LEGAL SERVICE TECHNOLOGY 
Online legal service technologies first appeared in the mid-
1990s, shortly after the creation of the World Wide Web.69 Ini-
tially, these websites were comprised of basic legal information 
databases that displayed text-based explanations of the law 
and individual rights.70 The web pages had no document-
drafting capabilities and provided relatively minimal benefit to 
low-income individuals in need of legal services.71 At the turn of 
the millennium, a select few companies began to offer pre-
prepared documents through their websites.72 Advances in In-
ternet technology prompted companies to incorporate more in-
tuitive and user-friendly designs, expand the number of availa-
ble services,73 and encouraged dozens of new entrants to the 
increasingly profitable field.74 Mylawyer.com, Inc., one of the 
earliest providers of online legal document preparation, saw 
100% revenue growth in 2003.75
Since 2007, ILPs have become progressively larger and 
more sophisticated. Significantly, many ILPs have made ad-
vancements from standardized forms to automated document 
assembly.
 Perpetuated by growth and 
competition, availability of certain legal document and infor-
mation services grew dramatically while costs to consumers 
shrank. 
76
 
 69. Johnson, supra note 
 Instead of providing pro-forma documents in a 
printable format, users can now enter relevant information in 
intuitive and user-friendly prompts, and the Internet software 
converts user submissions into court-ready documents. Web 
13, at 260.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 261.  
 73. Id.  
 74. See, e.g., COMPLETE CASE, http://www.completecase.com (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2012) (online divorce); LEGALZOOM INC., http://www.legalzoom.com 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (online wills, divorce, incorporations); 
SMARTLEGALFORMS, http://www.smartlegalforms.com (last visited Oct. 31, 
2012) (online divorce, bankruptcy, incorporations, wills).  
 75. Richard S. Granat, On-Line Legal Services for Low and Moderate In-
come Clients: Private Market Solutions to Meeting Legal Needs 3 (June 19, 
2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ilagnet.org/ 
conference/general2003/papers/richard_granat.pdf. 
 76. See, e.g., RAPIDOCS, http://www.epoq.co.uk/document-automation/ (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2012).  
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companies like Nolo and Rocket Lawyer generate hundreds of 
thousands of these prepared documents for consumers every 
year.77 LegalZoom claims to have prepared a million wills since 
its founding.78
Beyond document preparation, companies such as “Total 
Attorneys” are establishing virtual law offices on the Internet.
  
79 
These websites facilitate attorney-client interactions to create 
and modify documents, share calendars, and monitor billing.80 
Other sites, such as JustAnswer81 and LawGuru,82 allow users 
to ask a legal question, and get an answer, (sometimes) from a 
lawyer.83 As the ILP industry has grown, so too have its profits; 
LegalZoom is estimated to have earned $250 million in revenue 
in 2011.84 Consumers are benefiting as well, using these prod-
ucts as affordable alternatives to hiring an attorney.85
As the number of people using the Internet to transact 
business increases, so too does the demand for online legal ser-
vices. In January 2009 alone, an estimated 4.5 million individ-
uals used an Internet legal webpage for advice and solutions.
 
86
 
 77. Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is Flat: Globalization and Its Effect 
on Lawyers Practicing in Non-Global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 
527, 538 (2008) (noting that Nolo's and Quicken Willmaker Plus’s sales in-
creased nearly thirty-three percent in 2006 and that LegalZoom has served 
500,000 people since 2000).  
 
Although the precise demand is unknown, the trend towards 
 78. Richard S. Granat, President, DirectLaw, Inc., Co-Chair, ABA’s 
eLawyering Task Force, Address at the American Bar Association Commission 
on Ethics 20/20, Online Legal Services: The Future of the Legal Profession 18 
(Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/submissions.pdf.  
 79. See, e.g., TOTAL ATTORNEYS, http://www.totalattorneys.com/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 31, 2012); LEGAL ACCESS MGMT. GROUP, http://www.virtuallawoffice 
.net (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).  
 80. See TOTAL ATTORNEYS, supra note 79.  
 81. JUST ANSWER, http://www.justanswer.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
 82. LAW GURU, http://www.lawguru.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). 
 83. Attorneys participate in this arena to exhibit proficiency and presum-
ably to find clients. William Hornsby, Challenging the Legal Academy to a Du-
al (Perspective): The Need to Embrace Lawyering for Personal Legal Services, 
70 MD. L. REV. 420, 428 (2011). 
 84. The 100 Most Valuable Startups in the World, Revamped and Revised, 
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/2011-digital -100. 
 85. See, e.g., BY THE PEOPLE SAN LEANDRO, http://www.bythepeoplesl.com 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012) (advertising savings of fifty–seventy percent over 
in-person attorney’s fees).  
 86. Stephanie L. Kimbro, Esq., Owner, Kimbro Legal Services, LLC, Co-
founder, Virtual Law Office Technology, LLC, Technology Evangelist, Total 
Attorneys, Address at the American Bar Association Commission on Ethics 
20/20, Virtual Law Practice: Taking All or a Portion of Your Practice Online 24 
(Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://www.aba.net.org/ethics2020/submissions.pdf. 
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ILPs is taking place within the increased size and scope of 
modern web-based technology more generally.87 By some 
counts, there are roughly 1.25 billion unique Internet users 
who have access to more than 600 billion distinct webpages 
(there were fewer than 40 million Internet users in 1996).88 To-
day’s consumers use the Internet for medical diagnoses,89 to or-
der prescription medications,90 conduct business,91 perform 
stock trades,92 or close on a loan or mortgage.93 As one author 
notes, “[s]oftware and Internet services are eroding the territo-
ry that was once the exclusive domain of many professionals, 
including physicians, accountants, bankers, and brokers.”94
Unfortunately, significant demand for legal services by low 
and middle-income individuals continues to go unmet despite 
the emergence of ILPs.
 At-
torneys are notably omitted from this list. 
95 The situation has worsened in the 
wake of the recession beginning in 2008, which reduced legal 
aid in many states.96
C. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE 
RULES AND ILPS 
 
The growth in ILPs poses a significant challenge to the lo-
cal nature of legal practice regulation. Constitutionally, the 
federal government has authority under the Commerce Clause 
to regulate the Internet, which presumptively includes ILPs.97
 
 87. Fischer, supra note 
 
11, at 123.  
 88. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE 
OF LEGAL SERVICES 19 (2008).  
 89. See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, Two Online Health Site Operators to An-
nounce a Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at C2, available at http://www 
.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03deal.html?ref=webmdhealthcorporation. 
 90. See Greg Miller, A Turf War of Professionals vs. Software, L.A. TIMES, 
(Oct. 21, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/oct/21/news/mn-34752. 
 91. Id.  
 92. See, e.g., E-TRADE, www.etrade.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).  
 93. See Miller, supra note 90.  
 94. Fischer, supra note 11, at 123.  
 95. Ashby Jones, Lean Times at Legal Aid, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan 7, 
2011, 9:33 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/07/lean-times-at-legal-aid/. 
 96. See id.; see also Painter, supra note 15, at 45 (citing ABA Coal. for 
Justice Report on the Survey of Judges on the Impact of the Economic Down-
turn on Representation in Courts, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/JusticeCenter/PublicDocuments/CoalitionforJusticeSurveyRepor
t.authcheckdam.pdf ) (stating that unrepresented litigants have increased, 
which has negatively affected the outcomes of their litigation). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. For a general discussion of exclusive fed-
eral government regulation of the Internet under the commerce clause, see 
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Yet this federal power invariably conflicts with traditional state 
regulation of the unauthorized practice of law. Practically, ter-
ritorial limits of unauthorized practice statutes clash with in-
creased demands for business mobility and the multi-
jurisdictional nature of Internet legal resources.98 These chal-
lenges have led many state bar associations to resist the expan-
sion of ILPs through lawsuits and strengthened unauthorized 
practice of law statutes.99
Confrontation between legal self-help mechanisms and 
practice of law regulation traces its roots to self-help books and 
legal kits, which gained popularity in the 1960s and 1970s.
  
100 
After decades of controversy and contradictory court opinions, a 
majority of jurisdictions today do not classify the use of self-
help kits as the practice of law.101 To determine whether the 
practice of law exists, these jurisdictions focus on the existence 
of a personal relationship and if the consumer receives tailored 
information.102 Though courts have found that books and kits 
lack these elements, they are not so obviously absent in online 
legal software.103
As ILPs are relatively new, there is little case law on unau-
thorized practice statutes application to Internet legal re-
sources.
 As a result, and considering the popularity 
and potential benefits of Internet legal resources, regulation of 
legal self-help mechanisms have attracted the attention of 
courts and scholars.  
104 Indeed, most instances of unauthorized practice en-
forcement against ILPs have resulted in settlements.105
 
Dan L. Burk, How State Regulation of the Internet Violates the Commerce 
Clause, 17 CATO J., no. 2, 1997 at 147, 153–60 (1997), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj17n2/cj17n2-2.pdf. 
 In the 
 98. See Lewis & Braverman, supra note 19, at 26.  
 99. See e.g., Fischer, supra note 11, at 130 (“A leading method of keeping a 
check on this rapidly-evolving market is heightened enforcement of regula-
tions against the unauthorized practice of law.”).  
 100. For a history on legal self-help books, do-it-yourself kits and the unau-
thorized practice of law, see French, supra note 11, at 101–07. 
 101. See Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 651 (stating that use of self-
help kits does not meet the “personalized contact” requirement to qualify as 
the practice of law in a majority of jurisdictions).  
 102. See supra Part I.A.4.  
 103. French, supra note 11, at 115.  
 104. Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 651.  
 105. See, e.g., Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 510 (W.D. 
Mo. 2010) (discussing a class action lawsuit involving 14,000 litigants which 
resulted in settlement); see also Carrie Weimar, DIY Stores Walk Fine Line 
Between Law Help, Outlaw, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, http:// 
www.sptimes.com/2007/03/19/Southpinellas/DIY_legal_stores_walk.shtml 
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leading court test of ILPs, the Texas Bar’s unauthorized prac-
tice of law committee filed suit in U.S. District Court in Texas 
alleging that Parson Technology, Inc., owner of the product 
Quicken Family Lawyer, engaged in the unauthorized practice 
of law by providing software that generated legal documents.106 
The court ruled for the petitioner bar association, characteriz-
ing the software as a “cyberlawyer,” and enjoined its sale in 
Texas.107 Before the case was heard on appeal, the Texas legis-
lature changed the definition of unauthorized practice of law to 
state: “[T]he practice of law does not include the design, crea-
tion, publication, distribution, display, or sale . . . [of] computer 
software, or similar products if the products clearly and con-
spicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the 
advice of an attorney.”108 The Texas Legislature’s action may 
reveal broader attitudes that align ILP regulation with that of 
permissible self-help kits.109
Nevertheless, numerous practice-of-law committees con-
tinue to claim that ILPs are significantly different than books 
and kits, and find that the more interactive ILPs amount to the 
practice of law.
  
110
 
(discussing a 2006 settlement for $90,000 between “We The People” and the 
State of Tennessee for alleged violations of the unauthorized practice of law). 
But see, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Martin, 886 N.E.2d 827, 835 (Ohio 2008) 
(issuing an injunction and imposing civil penalties against "We The People" for 
engaging in authorized practice of law). 
 One author argues that the “[a]pplication 
of . . . [traditional] tests would, under traditional [unauthorized 
practice of law (UPL)] concepts, result in a ban on interactive 
 106. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 
956 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 107. Id.  
 108. Texas H.R. 1507, 1999 Leg., 76th Sess. (Tex. 1999).  
 109. See Palomar, supra note 55, at 431 (pointing out that “[s]everal state 
courts and legislatures, as well as both the Federal Trade Commission and the 
United States Department of Justice, have declined to accept mere assump-
tions as grounds for permitting unauthorized practice laws to restrict lay pro-
viders’ right to pursue their occupations and the public’s right to choose” (cita-
tion omitted)).  
 110. See, e.g., Douglas S. Malan, Picking a Fight Against Online Competi-
tion, 35 CONN. L. TRIB., no. 50, Dec. 14, 2009, at 5 (quoting Louis Pepe, Chair 
of the Connecticut Bar Association Task Force, who believes that LegalZoom 
and “[similar] websites are breaking the law by providing legal services in a 
state in which they are not licensed to practice”). In late 2009, the Connecticut 
Bar Association lobbied the state judiciary committee on a proposed bill that 
would make the unauthorized practice of law a felony rather than a misde-
meanor. Id.  
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legal software.”111 ILPs, specifically LegalZoom, share this con-
cern, which often settles unauthorized practice claims to avoid 
adverse case law that could potentially eliminate its industry.112 
Significantly, these fears may prevent investment which can 
move the industry forward,113
II.  OUTDATED UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE STATUTES 
STIFLE THE IMPORTANT GROWTH OF ILPS   
 and provide the innovation and 
utility which exists in other online industries. 
Harm resulting from the unauthorized practice of law is 
historically overstated.114 Parallel advancements in information 
technology and consumer sophistication make prospective inju-
ry even more remote today.115 Ultimately, stifled ILP innova-
tion is a troubling consequence of preserving outdated unau-
thorized practice rules.116
A. SHAKY FOUNDATION: PRESERVING UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE 
OF LAW STATUTES WITH OUTDATED RATIONALES  
 Today, ILPs lag behind other 
industries’ online proficiencies and underutilize technology’s 
potential to increase access and efficiency in the justice system.  
Despite the legal profession’s trepidation over non-lawyer 
products and services,117 there is little evidence that unauthor-
ized practice poses a significant danger to consumers.118 A study 
of 144 reported unauthorized practice cases from 1908 to 1969 
concluded that only twelve involved “specific injury.”119
 
 111. Cynthia L. Fountaine, When is a Computer a Lawyer?: Interactive Le-
gal Software, Unauthorized Practice of Law, and the First Amendment, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 147, 151 (2002). 
 Bar 
committees initiate a vast majority of unauthorized practice ac-
 112. Cf. Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, 
and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 221, 250 (2000) (discussing a Merrill Lynch settlement for “twice the 
amount of the federal tax liability dispute” to avoid adverse Tax Court prece-
dent).  
 113. See Granat, supra note 78, at 12.  
 114. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 139 (stating “there is strikingly little 
case law involving injury to individuals from unauthorized practice [of law]”).  
 115. See id. at 144–45.  
 116. See Granat, supra note 78, at 13 (stating that “the threat of a charge 
of [unauthorized practice of law] can chill innovation”).  
 117. See supra Part I.A.2.  
 118. See Hoppock, supra note 22, at 725–26.  
 119. Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good 
Fences Really Make Good Neighbors—Or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 159, 203 n.235 (1980).  
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tions to investigate potential injuries, as opposed to individuals 
alleging concrete harm.120 In fact, one study found that only two 
percent of unauthorized practice inquiries, investigations, and 
complaints arise from consumer complaints.121 The same study 
concluded that only eleven percent of reported unauthorized 
practice cases involving laypersons followed from any injury at 
all.122 Evidence regarding harmful effects of laypersons utilizing 
ILPs is equally sparse.123 Recent cases involving TurboTax124 
and LegalZoom125
In addition, traditional unauthorized practice justifications 
are ill-adapted for contemporary consumers, who can instanta-
neously access information on virtually any topic. Though this 
information may not be comprehensive, the ability to obtain 
vast quantities of information with unprecedented ease certain-
ly improves consumer savvy.
 further this claim, as petitioners in both cas-
es relied almost exclusively on unauthorized practice of law 
regulations for their respective causes of action. This fact alone 
is not dispositive, though the conspicuous lack of alleged harms 
strongly suggests that the often repeated traditional consumer 
protection rationale may be misplaced. 
126 Unauthorized practice statutes 
assume a pre-Internet level of naivety that simply no longer ex-
ists for growing numbers of sophisticated computer users. Indi-
viduals seeking legal services can benefit from the experience of 
past purchasers. Reputation systems allow buyers to leave 
comments on websites grading the service they received or stat-
ing their level of product approval.127
 
 120. Id. at 203; see also ABA Standing Comm. on Client Prot., supra note 
 “AngiesList.com” for home 
services and “Superlawyers.com” for attorneys are examples of 
profitable reputation systems modeled on reliable and unadul-
47, at 1–2.  
 121. Rhode, supra note 25, at 43. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 651; see Fischer, supra note 11, 
at 140.  
 124. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 
956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999).  
 125. Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 508 (W.D. Mo. 2010). 
 126. Stefanie Olsen, Intelligence in the Internet Age, CNET NEWS (Sept. 19, 
2005, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/Intelligence-in-the-Internet-age/2100-
11395_3-5869719.html (“What's undeniable is the Internet's democratization 
of information. It's providing instant access to information and, in a sense, im-
proving the practical application of intelligence for everyone.”).  
 127. See, e.g., ANGIE’S LIST, http://www.angieslist.com/howitworks.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2012).  
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terated consumer reviews.128 The success of these companies 
suggests that a similar reputation and rating system would 
likely develop for advanced ILPs. These reputation and rating 
systems would direct consumers to reliable legal resources and 
provide important information to create knowledgeable, capa-
ble, and savvy consumers of ILPs. As the ABA itself has recog-
nized: “[W]hen consumers know the pros and cons of the choic-
es of assistance, they will make reasonable ones with which 
government need not unduly interfere.”129
Moreover, market forces create strong incentives for ILPs 
to create reliable, cost-efficient and non-harmful products. A 
fundamental justification for strict unauthorized practice stat-
utes is that low-cost, non-attorney services will be inherently 
low quality.
 
130 Yet there is evidence that in many settings, non-
attorney resources can provide legal services as effectively, if 
not more effectively, than lawyers.131 Economic theory also indi-
cates that increased competition in the online legal market 
would create “better quality services at lower cost.”132 Compa-
nies must innovate and increase value to maintain customers, 
which includes continued implementation of consumer safe-
guards. A prominent example of this phenomenon is the finan-
cial industry, where banks continue to spend millions to add 
layers of authentication and “toughen encryption schemes.”133
Furthermore, outlets for consumer safety already exist 
within the law. Aggrieved consumers have remedies through 
 
Increasing safety is not merely ethical for these companies, it’s 
good business. Similar strong market incentives would likely 
apply to ILPs as well.  
 
 128. Id.; SUPERLAWYERS MAG., www.superlawyers.com (last visited Oct. 
31, 2012). Superlawyers further the reputation model with independent re-
search, peer nominations, and peer evaluations. Id.  
 129. ABA COMM. ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, supra note 24, at 133.  
 130. See Anthony Bertelli, Should Social Workers Engage in the Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 15, 34 (1998).  
 131. See generally HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY: LAWYERS AND 
NONLAWYERS AT WORK (1998) (studying four different legal settings: unem-
ployment compensation claims appeals, Social Security disability appeals, 
state tax appeals, and labor grievance arbitrations, and finding that 
nonlawyers can be effective advocates, in some situations more effective than 
lawyers).  
 132. See Pearce, supra note 42, at 1273.  
 133. Why Customer Authentication Needs to go Straight to the Source, 
TRUSTID (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.trustid.com/blog/tag/customer 
-authentication/; Visa Unveils Next Step in Authentication Strategy, 
CSPNET.COM (Aug. 21, 2012), www.cspnet.com/news/technology/articles/visa 
-unveils-next-step-authentication-strategy.  
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malpractice actions grounded in tort,134 contract,135 and con-
sumer protection laws.136 Malpractice remedies already serve as 
a strong deterrent against unreliable legal advice.137
The need to regulate ILPs becomes even more problematic 
when looking at analogous developments in other sectors of our 
economy that have safely adapted information technology to aid 
consumers. In this regard, medicine serves as a good example. 
Over the past decade, the Internet has changed the face of 
healthcare.
 Seen from 
this perspective, unauthorized practice mechanisms as con-
sumer protection remedies are redundant; existing market 
forces already incentivize consumer protection, while a variety 
of legal actions provide significant tools for redress.  
138 Health-related sites provide highly specific and 
practical advice on caring for “every imaginable condition from 
the most routine to the most deadly and complex.”139 These 
sites provide conventional medical advice as well as alternative 
methods, and provide access to vast medical resources includ-
ing journals, presentations, and research tools that would oth-
erwise be unclear or difficult to find.140
 
 134. Hoppock, supra note 
  
22, at 727.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Fischer, supra note 11, at 145.  
 137. See generally Tom W. Bell, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of 
Legal Malpractice Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.1533, 1534–45 (1992).  
 138. Pam R. Rajendran, The Internet: Ushering in a New Era of Medicine, 
285 MS JAMA 804, 804 (2001), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/ 
data/Journals/JAMA/4771/JMS0214.pdf. 
 139. Michael S. Goldstein, The Persistence and Resurgence of Medical Plu-
ralism, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 925, 936 (2004); see also P. Greg Gulick, 
E-Health and the Future of Medicine: The Economic, Legal, Regulatory, Cul-
tural, and Organizational Obstacles Facing Telemedicine and Cybermedicine 
Programs, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 351, 355–56 (2002) (describing the emerg-
ing “e-health” industry and the increasing use of the Internet by patients to 
consult medical information and advice). See generally Barbara J. Williams, 
Virtual Web Wave of the Future: Integration of Healthcare Systems on the In-
ternet, 76 N.D. L. REV. 365 (2000) (exploring the rise of the medical communi-
ty’s use of computer information systems).  
 140. Goldstein, supra note 139, at 936. An enormous volume of users visit 
these sites; statistics show that up to 55 percent of all Internet users access 
online health information. See Matthew Breckons et al., What Do Evaluation 
Instruments Tell Us About the Quality of Complementary Medicine Infor-
mation on the Internet?, 10 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e3 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2483844. As a result, the indus-
try is growing. WebMD claimed more than $570 million in revenue for 2010. 
See YAHOO FIN. WEBMD HEALTH CORP., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ks? 
s=WBMD (last visited Oct. 31, 2012). Within the past year, researchers at 
Mayo Clinic and I.B.M. launched a website for collaboration in the tools used 
for searching records and data stores of all kinds in medicine. See Steve Lohr, 
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Many believe online healthcare technology has revolution-
ized the industry for the better. Personalized Internet medical 
services such as “telemedicine,” where a doctor receives patient 
information and disburses medical advice online, have been 
tremendously successful.141 A number of scholars point out that 
telemedicine plays an instrumental role in alleviating current 
health care crises in the United States.142 Scholars also consider 
web-based diagnostic services an important medical advance-
ment. The New York Times Magazine review of the Mayo Clin-
ic’s online “Symptom Checker” stated, “[w]hat you’ll get is: No 
hysteria. No drug peddling. Good Medicine. Good ideas.”143 Fur-
thermore, experts have conducted significant research on the 
reliability of these websites144 and numerous non-profit founda-
tions and agencies monitor online medical advice, and provide 
analytics and advice for consumers.145 Though there are cer-
tainly concerns about medical advice on the Internet, there is a 
general consensus that the benefits of online medical resources 
outweigh the risks.146
As in law, the online delivery of medical advice and finan-
cial services has significant potential for abuse. Why then are 
consumers permitted to entrust their health and wealth to the 
Internet, yet when it comes to drafting an uncontested divorce, 
the risk is simply too great? Diagnostic legal websites, which 
are currently illegal in every state, would presumably operate 
and function similarly to their medical counterparts. Advanced 
 It is thus especially interesting that the 
capabilities of these on-line medical systems are well beyond 
those of existing ILPs, in quality, depth, and personalized ser-
vice.  
 
Health Care Industry Moves Slowly onto the Internet, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Apr. 
5, 2009, 1:35 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/health-care 
-industry-moves-slowly-onto-the-internet. 
 141. See Amar Gupta & Deth Sao, The Constitutionality of Current Legal 
Barriers to Telemedicine in the United States: Analysis and Future Directions 
of Its Relationship to National and International Health Care Reform, 21 
HEALTH MATRIX: J. LAW-MED. 385, 389 (2011).  
 142. See id.  
 143. Virginia Heffernan, A Prescription for Fear, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 4, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/magazine/06FOB-Medium-t.html.  
 144. See, e.g., id.  
 145. E.g., HEALTH ON NET FOUND., http://www.hon.ch/ (last visited Oct. 31, 
2012); MED. LIBR. ASS’N, http://mlanet.org/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); NAT’L 
LIBR. MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/webeval/webeval.html (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2012).  
 146. See Gupta & Sao, supra note 141, at 386–88; see also Susan E. 
Volkert, Telemedicine: Rx for the Future of Health Care, 6 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 147, 153 (2000).  
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ILPs would apply facts to the law; suggest legal precedents, 
statutes, available legal actions and attorneys. Consumers 
would see such material as background information and sug-
gestive action. Indeed, individuals do not reflexively transport 
themselves to an operating table simply because a website told 
them they have serious heart disease. The information triggers 
a process, and empowers the consumer to seek remedies or pro-
fessionals if necessary. Ultimately, there is little market evi-
dence that online legal resources pose a significant danger to 
consumers. Individuals receive protection through unprece-
dented access to information, redress through malpractice ac-
tions, and market forces which promote creating and maintain-
ing safe and reliable products.  
B. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW STATUTES INHIBIT ILP 
INNOVATION 
The legal bar’s general concern with “public interest” ne-
glects other important public priorities such as freedom of 
choice, encouraging market-based innovations, and more wide-
ly available legal services.147 Current legislative pressures to 
create new regulatory measures for the Internet also inhibit 
important investment in, and development of, advanced Inter-
net resources.148 Consequently, bar associations and legisla-
tures defend themselves from new advances with strict unau-
thorized practice rules, rather than embrace them with 
innovative ways to deliver legal services.149
As technology advances, some experts envision cutting-
edge online systems which can diagnose and analyze legal is-
sues, provide basic advice and information, and generate rele-
vant court-ready documents.
  
150 The development of such valua-
ble systems is capital intensive, and large investments of this 
type typically come from non-attorney businesses.151 Penetrat-
ing consumer legal markets likely requires collaboration with 
professionals in marketing, finance, system engineering and 
project management.152
 
 147. See Christensen, supra note 
 Yet as one ABA journalist comments: 
119, at 201–02. 
 148. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 148.  
 149. See SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 99.  
 150. See Granat, supra note 78, at 12; see also Johnson, supra note 13, at 
278–79.  
 151. See Granat, supra note 78, at 12. 
 152. William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Paradigm Shift, A.B.A. 
J., no. 7, 2011 40, 45–47.  
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“Few lawyers have the time, financial wherewithal or risk tol-
erance to play in this league.”153 Attorneys are simply unwill-
ing, or unable, to invest the necessary resources to create the 
type of advanced systems to succeed in the consumer-driven In-
ternet market.154 As a result, advanced ILPs by non-attorney 
corporations, who are more familiar with this type of risky in-
vestment and specialized entrepreneurship, are likely to pro-
duce such services.155
Nevertheless, unclear and inconsistent unauthorized prac-
tice rules create confusion among attorneys, individuals, and 
businesses alike. Historically, legal uncertainty affects inves-
tors’ willingness to invest in any industry.
  
156 The potential for 
regulation from fifty fluctuating sets of rules thus discourages 
investors interested in online legal space.157 One entrepreneur 
familiar with venture investment in online legal resources stat-
ed that vague unauthorized practice rules were the “single 
most debilitating factor” for the efficient creation of online legal 
resources.158 That same entrepreneur argued that adjustments 
made to act in accordance with these rules “decreased the utili-
ty of the product significantly.”159
Indeed, judicial decisions or legislative resolutions may be 
necessary “to clear the Internet’s murky waters” before compa-
nies engage in the research and development essential to create 
  
 
 153. See id; see also SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 254 (“Just as librarians 
did not create Google, lawyers may not create tomorrow’s innovations in legal 
practice.”).  
 154. See Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 152 (arguing that the tradi-
tional law firm billing structure prevents the risk-taking and experimentation 
that is necessary for innovation).  
 155. See supra Part I.A.4.  
 156. See generally Sophie Manigart et al., Determinants of Required Return 
in Venture Capital Investments: A Five-Country Study, 17 J. BUS. VENTURING 
291, 298 (2002), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ 
S0883902600000677 (“Differences in the institutional, legal and cultural envi-
ronment, and in dominant corporate governance systems may significantly in-
fluence the conduct of business.” (citation omitted)).  
 157. See, e.g., Skype Interview with Tanner Doe, Entrepreneur (Nov. 17, 
2011) (on file with author) (stating in reference to online legal space that 
“many people [are] waiting on the sidelines before they dive in”) [hereinafter 
Interview with Tanner Doe]; see also Skype Interview with Erin Doe, Entre-
preneur (Nov. 16, 2011) (on file with author) (discussing roadblocks to entre-
preneurs interested in providing online legal services). Both individuals 
wished to remain anonymous due to the current nature of their employment. 
Each individual receives a pseudonym here.  
 158. Interview with Tanner Doe, supra note 157, at 13:12.  
 159. Id. at 11:34.  
  
2012] STIFLED JUSTICE 731 
 
advanced ILP services.160 Yet state legislatures and courts alike 
have been reluctant to promulgate explicit rules regarding the 
unauthorized practice of law.161 Fears of adverse precedent mo-
tivate industry players to work against definitive decisions as 
well. Since their emergence, ILPs have preferred settlements 
over potentially clarifying adjudications.162 The cyclical result 
perpetuates ambiguity, which in turn inhibits new investment 
in more advanced systems.163
Additionally, unauthorized practice rules divert ILP devel-
opment away from those who most need it. ILPs spend signifi-
cant resources to defend unauthorized practice lawsuits, which 
focuses their resources away from investment.
  
164 More specifi-
cally, the current legal landscape largely tolerates existing ILP 
document preparation services, such as wills and incorporation 
documents, as well as lawyer referral networks.165 Yet the bulk 
of those who need legal assistance, and cannot afford it, require 
legal diagnostic systems and responsive legal information, not 
forms for wills and business incorporation documents.166
 
 160. Marc L. Caden & Stephanie E. Lucas, Accidents on the Information 
Superhighway: On-Line Liability and Regulation, 2 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 101 
(1996).  
 Unfor-
tunately, further development of existing services fails to ad-
 161. One exception is the Texas state legislature. See TEX GOV’T CODE 
ANN. § 81.101 (West 2005). 
 162. See, e.g., Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 271 F.R.D. 506, 510–11 (W.D. 
Mo. 2010) (class action lawsuit involving 14,000 litigants which resulted in 
settlement); see also Weimar, supra note 105 (discussing a 2006 settlement for 
$90,000 between Internet legal services provider “We The People” and the 
State of Tennessee regarding allegations of unauthorized practice of law). But 
see, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Martin, 886 N.E.2d 827, 835 (Ohio 2008) (is-
suing an injunction and imposing civil penalties against “We The People” for 
engaging in unauthorized practice of law).  
 163. See generally Manigart et al., supra note 156 (discussing the reasons 
behind venture capitalist investment).  
 164. See, e.g., Janson, 271 F.R.D. at 508; see also Painter, supra note 15, at 
55–56 (“Several state bar associations, including Connecticut’s, have begun 
investigations of online providers of legal documents.”).  
 165. Some document preparation services have successfully litigated 
against unauthorized practice regulation. As a result, a majority of current 
ILPs focus their products in this arena. See supra Part I.B–C. 
 166. Ronald W. Staudt, Technology, the Courts and Self-represented Liti-
gants (June 18, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ilganet 
.org/conference/general2003/papers/staudt.pdf (arguing that serving self-
represented litigants requires “reengineering, total quality management, per-
sonalized segments of one, supply side value chains and net communities”). 
The unaddressed needs discussed by Mr. Staudt are strikingly similar to those 
of individual healthcare. The online medical industry increasingly meets such 
needs. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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dress these significant needs. In the end, unauthorized practice 
rules deter vital corporate investment in ILP systems, and in-
hibit the potential for ILPs to aid all actors in the legal system. 
C. THE BENEFITS OF INTERNET LEGAL RESOURCE 
ADVANCEMENT  
ILP advancement is likely to help consumers, underprivi-
leged litigants, courts, and attorneys. ILPs will likely accom-
plish this with two broad categories of innovation: commoditi-
zation of legal services and unbundling of legal services.167 The 
commoditization of legal services homogenizes easily replicated 
legal tasks, and packages these tasks for quick and inexpensive 
delivery to customers.168 Routine output of legal documents and 
information lowers production costs as it is unnecessary to re-
tain a new billing attorney for every unique matter. Advanced 
diagnostic systems analyze similar situations and issues, and 
can disseminate information for nearly every fact pattern. The 
unbundling of legal services separates the historically compre-
hensive legal package into distinct sections.169 The consumer is 
then capable of purchasing only those services that he or she 
needs.170 This process has the potential to eliminate retainers, 
lower fees, and give consumers more control to determine ex-
actly what they need from a legal services provider.171
With these innovations in mind, ILPs lower legal costs and 
increase access to legal services for all consumers. There are a 
number of situations where the lives of most non-lawyers would 
benefit from legal assistance.
 
172 Nevertheless, getting legal ad-
vice today seems “too costly, excessively time consuming, too 
cumbersome and convoluted, or just plain scary.”173
 
 167. See Johnson, supra note 
 ILPs’ abili-
ties to address these issues, by efficiently and cheaply deliver-
ing legal guidance via the Internet may change this mentali-
13, at 262–63.  
 168. See id. at 262.  
 169. See Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundle Your Practice, GPSOLO, no. 18, 
2001, 22, 22–23. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See id. at 26–27. The unbundled service allows clients to control their 
legal work on a pay-as-you-go basis, potentially eliminating expensive retain-
ers. See id. at 26. 
 172. Consider fender-benders, drafting a will, petty crimes or getting a di-
vorce. In Connecticut, “80 to 85 percent of divorces have a self-represented 
party, because most families can’t afford to hire one lawyer, let alone two.” 
Henderson & Zahorksy, supra note 152, at 42 (quoting another source).  
 173. SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 234.  
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ty.174 Furthermore, traditional legal service is reactive in na-
ture—people seek out lawyers to respond to situations around 
them. Yet most individuals would certainly choose to avoid le-
gal issues rather than resolve them through attorneys and the 
justice system. As on scholar aptly stated, “most people would 
surely prefer a fence at the top of the cliff rather than an ambu-
lance at the bottom.”175 To the extent that ILPs can provide ac-
cess to inexpensive and extensive legal guidance, before an at-
torney is traditionally required, ILPs create a new preventative 
market for consumer driven legal services.176 In this way, ILPs 
should create a “more just society in the same way that immun-
ization leads to a healthier community.”177
In addition, ILP development is especially significant for 
individuals who cannot afford legal assistance under the tradi-
tional face-to-face model.
 Presumably, attor-
neys employ similar knowledge on a daily basis to avoid dis-
putes. As such, ILPs have the potential to democratize legal 
prevention by distributing legal guidance traditionally reserved 
for trained attorneys with vast resources.  
178 This population includes the lower 
middle class earn enough money to be disqualified from public 
aid but who cannot afford an attorney. According to a 2009 
ABA committee report, sixty-two percent of surveyed U.S. 
judges said the lack of legal representation harmed parties be-
fore them and that litigants are “generally doing a poor job of 
representing themselves.”179
 
 174. See id. (“[T]his market will be liberated by the availability of straight-
forward, no-nonsense, online . . . systems . . . [that] will provide affordable, 
easy access to legal guidance.”). 
 Though there is not yet substantial 
empirical evidence that advanced ILPs would comprehensively 
fix this problem, some legal help for this population is surely 
better than none. ILPs provide convenient low cost legal advice 
and help fill the gap left by overworked and reduced legal aid 
 175. Id at 231.  
 176. See id. at 231–32. 
 177. Id. at 231. 
 178. See Painter, supra note 15, at 54; see also Erik Eckholm, Interest Rate 
Drop Has Dire Results for Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2009/01/19/us/19legal.html?pagewanted=all (“[R]equests for [le-
gal aid group] services have risen by 30 percent or more.”).  
 179. Painter, supra note 15, at 45. Professor Painter based this opinion on 
a 2010 ABA report in which sixty-two percent of judges agreed that a lack of 
representation generally results in worse outcomes. See LINDA KLEIN, ABA 
COAL. FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF JUDGES ON THE IMPACT OF 
THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON REPRESENTATION IN THE COURTS 3 (2010).  
  
734 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:709 
 
services.180 Individuals who live in isolated areas or who have 
restricted mobility can also use ILP services. The availability of 
legal services, without engaging an attorney, may encourage 
individuals to seek legal guidance who would otherwise be 
afraid to seek such advice in person.181
ILP advancement can also aid the overburdened court sys-
tem. The 2010 ABA report by the ABA Coalition for Justice 
found that seventy-eight percent of judges believe a lack of rep-
resentation to these parties negatively impacts the court sys-
tem,
  
182 Ninety percent of those judges said that court proce-
dures slow, and seventy-one percent of judges said that pro se 
litigants use more staff time for assistance.183 Addressing this 
problem, scholar Robert Staudt concluded that “[m]any of the 
information processing and customer relationship management 
tools of modern business could be applied to the challenges 
courts face as they struggle to improve customer service to self-
represented litigants.”184
Though the legal profession generally greeted ILPs with a 
hostile reception, there is reason to believe that the new tech-
nology can aid attorneys as well. First, law firms and solo prac-
titioners can utilize ILPs to aid their practice. In document-
heavy practice areas, for example, new technology may reduce 
unit cost and profit per document, but it could dramatically in-
crease volume, leading to higher profitability.
 To the extent that ILPs provide inex-
pensive resources and a wealth of individualized information, 
the court administration will see litigants who are more pre-
pared.  
185 Attorneys 
could save time and resources by allowing ILPs to apply unique 
client information to pro forma documents. Second, automating 
tasks allows attorneys to focus on more challenging and multi-
faceted issues.186 Third, ILPs have the potential to introduce 
new consumers into the legal system.187
 
 180. See Jones, supra note 
 In this way, ILPs likely 
supplement the legal market for attorney services, not supplant 
95. 
 181. See Blades & Vermylen, supra note 10, at 653. This is especially im-
portant considering the broad mistrust of the legal profession. See, e.g., 
Granat, supra note 78, at 2.  
 182. See KLEIN, supra note 179, at 4.  
 183. See id.  
 184. Staudt, supra note 166, at 5.  
 185. See SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 36.  
 186. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 282.  
 187. See id. at 279–82. 
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it.188 Many ILPs will likely continue to refer clients to attorneys 
for specific, more complex matters.189 ILPs may also lower the 
attorney intimidation factor, and increase consumer interest in 
legal remedies for their daily problems.190 Regardless of these 
potential benefits, ILPs, even in their most advanced form, are 
unlikely to replace many of the more profitable legal services 
such as complex corporate transactions and factually complex 
litigation.191 Like good doctors, there will always be a market 
for skilled attorneys.192
Despite these strong justifications for eliminating current 
unauthorized practice rules, some regulation of online legal re-
sources is still necessary. Some commentators argue that the 
Internet actually increases the potential harm from unauthor-
ized practice of law because the new medium exposes a larger 
audience to a wider variety of potential abuses.
  
193 Inaccurate 
legal advice delivered over the Internet can indeed seriously 
harm consumers.194 Widespread Internet use and minimal 
transparency only intensifies this concern. Furthermore, be-
cause existing state rules of professional conduct generally only 
regulate attorneys, ILPs carry no protection against conflicts of 
interest and breaches of confidentiality by non-attorney ILPs.195
 
 188. See id. at 282 (“To the extent that [ILPs] bring [new] consumers into 
the legal system, they expand the market rather than shift it away from at-
torneys.”).  
 
For example, courts could force non-lawyers to testify about po-
tentially sensitive communications between ILPs and consum-
 189. See, e.g., id. at 283 (discussing several ILPs that have implemented 
attorney referral services).  
 190. See id. at 268–69 (arguing that ILPs will allow consumers to overcome 
their fear and mistrust of lawyers, and “gain comfort with legal assistance at 
their own pace”).  
 191. See id. at 282 (“Large firms that handle complex corporate matters 
will not be seriously affected by [ILPs].”); SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 88 (“[I]n 
the future, legal service that requires considerable expertise or an ongoing 
personal touch will still be in demand in the traditional way . . . .”). 
 192. Advanced health websites have not eliminated the need for doctors, 
but it may have changed some of their traditional functions. See Anna Wilde 
Mathews, The Doctor Will Text You Now, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2009), http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203872404574257900513900382 
.html.  
 193. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 90.  
 194. See discussion supra Part I.A.2.  
 195. See Underwood, supra note 20, at 440 (“[C]lients of nonlawyers prac-
ticing law forgo the protection afforded by state rules of professional conduct 
. . . .”). 
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ers.196 Adherence to state licensing rules is also not currently 
required of ILPs.197
Ultimately, potential benefits to consumers, unprivileged 
litigants, courts, and even attorneys outweigh even the most 
serious risks associated with relaxed regulation of ILPs. Im-
portant legal services are beyond the financial reach of millions 
of low-income and middle-income Americans. Harnessing the 
power of the Internet through ILPs has the power to alleviate 
this epidemic. Existing market forces, including malpractice ac-
tions, corporate success, and modified regulation provide robust 
alternatives to the outdated and stifling unauthorized practice 
regime.  
 For these reasons, there should be some 
balanced regulation addressing consumer protection concerns 
regarding ILPs.  
III.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS   
Fundamental changes are needed to create safe and valua-
ble ILP alternatives to insufficient and inadequate traditional 
legal services. However, an outright elimination of unauthor-
ized practice statutes is neither a prudent nor a likely solution. 
Instead, a two-part proposal should be implemented which re-
quires action by the ABA, states, and ILPs: (a) states should 
adopt a new ABA Model Rule that relaxes unnecessary regula-
tion and advances free-market principles; and (b) ILPs should 
be required to comply with reasonable state licensing, disclo-
sure, and accreditation requirements.  
A. STATES SHOULD ADOPT AN ABA MODEL RULE THAT 
RELAXES UNNECESSARY REGULATION AND ADVANCES FREE 
MARKET PRINCIPLES  
The ABA should create a new model rule defining the prac-
tice of law over the Internet.198
 
 196. Cf. Hunt v. Maricopa Cnty. Emp. Merit Sys. Comm’n, 619 P.2d 1036, 
1041 (Ariz. 1980) (“[T]here is no statutory privilege to protect the confidential-
ity of communications between an employee and his non-lawyer representa-
tive.”).  
 The rule should, first and fore-
 197. Granat, supra note 78, at 12. However, malpractice actions might en-
force accountability. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional 
Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 105 (1995) (“The time has come to 
consider legal malpractice law as part of the system of lawyer regulation.”). 
 198. Indeed, the ABA undertook a similar task in 2002 by attempting to 
revise the unauthorized practice rule, yet failed to do so. See Underwood, su-
pra note 20, at 449–50.  
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most, separate the jurisdictional regulation of attorneys199 from 
the regulation of multi-jurisdictional ILPs. Establishing specific 
rules for ILPs will eliminate confusion for attorneys, consum-
ers, and courts, and provide incentives for investment by com-
panies currently reluctant to invest in this highly uncertain le-
gal terrain.200 Specifically, the new ABA rule should legalize 
document preparation, diagnostic mechanisms, and reactive le-
gal information provided by ILPs, assuming those ILPs comply 
with reasonable state accreditation and licensure require-
ments.201 Authorizing the sale of non-personalized ILP prod-
ucts, as is now permitted in Texas, is an important first step to 
achieve this clarity.202 The current reality of allowing these 
products is that while many providers can sell legal software, 
they cannot instruct the consumer on how to use it most effec-
tively.203 New ABA unauthorized practice provisions should 
thus relax restrictions on personalized features of ILPs as well. 
For example, diagnostic structures that apply facts to law serve 
as a linchpin between the individual and Internet legal re-
sources. As in medicine, this feature is critically important to 
enable consumers to direct intelligibly their research. A relaxed 
rule will likely spur innovation, creating more advanced, inter-
active, consumer-friendly systems. This cascading phenomenon 
is exemplified in the online healthcare industry, where person-
alized information already helps large numbers of consumers, 
which in turn spurs more investment.204 There is strong reason 
to believe this would also take place with free market ILPs, as 
companies will increasingly enter the legal market “where val-
ue is being counted in billions and the current working practic-
es seem antiquated or inefficient.”205
 
 199. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a)–(b) (2012).  
 Allowing the market to 
drive innovation will also balance these services in many re-
spects, as useful products thrive while ineffective or harmful 
providers wither.  
 200. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 201. See discussion infra Part III.B.  
 202. See TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101 (West 2005) (“[T]he ‘practice of 
law’ does not include the design, creation, publication, distribution, display, or 
sale . . . [of] computer software, or similar products if the products clearly and 
conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an 
attorney.”).  
 203. See Painter, supra note 15, at 57.  
 204. See supra Part II.A. and accompanying text. 
 205. SUSSKIND, supra note 88, at 253.  
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States should adopt a new ABA Model Rule that embraces 
the potential of the Internet to increase accessibility of legal 
services. Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of professional con-
duct is already widespread. To date, California is the only state 
not to adopt professional conduct rules that follow the format of 
the ABA Model Rule.206 To be sure, states will have legitimate 
concerns before they adopt relaxed regulations, especially given 
the speed and efficiency of the Internet and the potential for 
significant abuse.207 Advertising and advanced web design can 
create an impression of reliability, while masking unqualified 
and potentially harmful legal advice.208
B. ILPS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH REASONABLE 
STATE LICENSING, DISCLOSURE, AND ACCREDITATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
 For this reason, and to 
reduce likely resistance from certain sectors of the organized 
bar, relaxed regulation of ILPs must be accompanied by mean-
ingful oversight through state licensing and accreditation re-
quirements.  
State licensure and regulation of ILPs is necessary to alle-
viate the most significant concerns of legal malpractice over the 
Internet. In order to receive a license, ILPs should be required 
to comply with reasonable regulations that include a variety of 
consumer protection standards. For example, disclosure rules 
could require ILPs to state when a service is not comprehen-
sive. Such disclosure would inform clients about the limitations 
of ILPs up front, including a warning about the potential harm 
that often results from misapplied legal advice. For more com-
plicated facts, ILPs should provide background information, 
while certain facts trigger attorney referrals and more infor-
mation about ILP limitations. If personalized service by an ILP 
employee is required, the entity sould be required to disclose 
these individuals to the client. Disclosure of whether lawyers or 
non-lawyers provided services, and other qualifications of these 
 
 206. Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/ 
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules 
.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).  
 207. See In re Bernales, 345 B.R. 206, 219, 226 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) 
(concluding that a bankruptcy petition preparer, operating through a website, 
failed to disclose his limitations as an attorney and gave improper legal ad-
vice, resulting in missed court deadlines and “potentially harmful consequenc-
es . . .”).  
 208. See Miller, supra note 90. 
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employees, also should be required. A system of accreditation 
would oversee compliance and issue licenses. Existing accredi-
tation systems for web-based post-secondary schools,209 which 
operate in conjunction with the United States Department of 
Education,210
Accreditation requirements also should include specific 
protections designed to prevent disclosure of confidential in-
formation. This would include advanced scanning systems to 
prevent malware, and network backup mechanisms. Governing 
bodies could mandate certain communication rules. For exam-
ple, customer service agents could be restricted to helping indi-
viduals navigate their product, and prohibited from providing 
specific advice. Regulation also should also require ILP em-
ployment of a licensed supervising attorney in each jurisdiction 
in which the ILP sells its product—potentially resulting in nu-
merous supervising attorneys. These individuals would be re-
sponsible for providing accurate and up-to-date legal infor-
mation. Minimum competency requirements, similar to state 
continuing legal education standards for attorneys,
 could serve as a potential framework for such In-
ternet oversight.  
211
There is legitimate apprehension that a majority of states 
may not adopt these proposals; for this reason, some advocate 
for a national rule to create the uniformity and clarity neces-
sary to effectuate ILP advancement.
 also could 
also be required for non-attorney creators of legal content. ILPs 
should design these licensure and accreditation requirements 
to ensure a minimum level of accuracy and accountability.  
212
 
 209. See, e.g., Accreditations and Licensures, U. PHX., http://www.Phoenix 
.edu/about_us/accreditation.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2012); HIGHER LEARN-
ING COMMISSION, http://www.ncahlc.org/#ncahlc.org (last visited Oct. 31, 
2012). 
 A federal statute in par-
ticular would create much-needed nationwide uniformity for 
 210. See Secretary’s Recognition Procedures for State Agencies, 34 C.F.R. 
§ 603 (2011); The Database of Accredited Postsecondary Institutions and Pro-
grams, U.S. DEPARTMENT EDUC., http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/ (last visited 
March 8, 2012).  
 211. See, e.g., Rules of the Minnesota State Board of Continuing Legal Edu-
cation, MINN. BOARD CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., http://www.mbcle.state.mn 
.us/mbcle/pages/rules.asp#rule1 (last visited Oct. 31, 2012).  
 212. See, e.g., Peter Krakaur, Internet Advertising: States of Disarray? Are 
Uniform Rules a More Practical Solution?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1997, at S14 
(“Uniform rules would level the field for all lawyers, and provide clear guid-
ance on how to disseminate information to the public.”).  
  
740 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:709 
 
ILP regulations and promote investment in ILP innovation.213 
But the regulation of lawyers for generations has been a state 
function, and federal legislation preempting state law in this 
arena is unlikely.214 State bar associations also would likely re-
sist such federal legislation.215
  CONCLUSION   
 Although a uniform standard is 
ideal for many reasons, state adoption of an ABA Model Rule 
establishes a more practical mechanism by which to facilitate 
much-needed change.  
A fundamental premise of this Note is that states, lawyers, 
and the ABA must trust consumers to use legal information 
safely. Certainly, the speed and wide-spread use of ILPs pre-
sents a challenge to the legal profession, which regulates the 
practice of law to protect the public from the hazards of unqual-
ified legal advice. Yet restricting the delivery of legal services to 
bar members only is an outdated quality control instrument, 
creating an unnecessary and harmful scarcity of legal services. 
Bar associations and state legislatures should not be so en-
trenched in local conventions as to disregard the clear benefits 
to the public of increased access to legal services. Democratiza-
tion of information, which is a fundamental characteristic of 
the Internet, will over time curb potential injury from unau-
thorized practice actions. Market forces can drive businesses to 
create increasingly more reliable and effective legal resources. 
Malpractice actions will continue to provide meaningful con-
sumer protection in many cases. And reasonable state disclo-
sure and license requirements will serve as an important quali-
ty check on the market-driven development of ILPs.  
The legal profession is not—and should not be—immune 
from technology that is transforming all of us in innumerable 
ways. The legal community, the unauthorized practice commit-
 
 213. Federal regulation would be exercised under Commerce clause power. 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. This would preempt inconsistent state law under 
the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. See also Burk, supra note 
97, at 147–60. 
 214. See Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: 
Emerging Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 
969 (1992).  
 215. State bar associations are very influential in some jurisdictions. See, 
e.g., Malan, supra note 110, at 5 (discussing a report by a Connecticut Bar 
task force alleging that twenty websites violated Connecticut law by providing 
legal services without state licensure). Due to this strong influence, relying on 
states alone will unlikely create the broad, consistent regulation needed to 
spur innovation.  
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tees, and state judiciaries should embrace significant advances 
in ILP technology, and adopt relaxed regulatory schemes with 
baseline disclosure and accreditation safeguards. By imple-
menting proper safety mechanisms to protect consumers, with-
out substantially limiting the capacity of ILPs to improve deliv-
ery of legal services, millions of Americans will, for the first 
time, be able to enjoy, safely and efficiently, meaningful access 
to the judicial system.  
 
